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ANALYZING PROPERTY  
IN DIFFERENT SOCIETIES∗
Jacques Vanderlinden†∗  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The distinction between persons and things is, for sure, one 
which needs to be revisited; the diversity and quality of the 
contributions to this workshop are ample evidence of it.  
Furthermore, most of them, inspired by the reflections of their 
authors and the eight questions so adequately proposed by the 
initiators of this joint venture, are, quite naturally centered on law 
systems which are familiar to teachers and students in European and 
North American law schools.  The ambit and purpose of this paper is 
however quite different, as they leave the familiar shores of the 
Roman-inspired legal traditions (I am exlusively referring here to the 
distinction between persons and things) for those of the continent 
celebrated by Joseph Conrad in Heart of Darkness.1
 The reference to Conrad’s work is particularly appropriate as the 
following considerations deal with pre-colonial African laws, as 
applied in societies which are indeed quite different from that in 
which Gaius2 established the summa division, which still rules a 
good part of the formal apparent structure of many civil codes 
throughout the world.  But let us be quite clear: there is no such thing 
as pre-colonial “African law.”  The laws of Africa, even if one limits 
oneself to so-called “ black” Africa–the one spreading from the 
southern limit of the Sahara Desert to the Cape of Good Hope–reveal 
 
∗  This written version differs substantially from my oral contribution to the 
workshop; this is due to the fact–for which I apologize to the reader–that I am 
unable to write a text before I speak on a specific topic. In a sense, to be true to the 
title of the workshops, this is a “revisited” version of what I said. 
† Professor of Law Emeritus (Free University of Brussels, Belgium; and 
University of Moncton, N.-B., Canada).  
1.  JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS,  available at 
http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/ConDark.html (last visited November 
6, 2008).  
2. Who taught law, by the way, in Africa, where the classical structure of the 
digesta was less evident than in Rome. 
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huge differences between the laws of people practicing agriculture, 
commerce, fishing, gathering, hunting, and pasturing (if one looks 
only at their mode of economic production) or having adopted 
various types of socio-political systems (from the extended family to 
one form or another of pre-state political regime) as their mode of 
government. Such diversity precludes any serious generalization, 
even on a regional or sub-regional basis.  It is often said that most 
lawyers (or legal anthropologists) who present the legal system of an 
African ethnic group necessarily limit themselves to one group (or 
possibly two) in the course of their academic career.  There must 
accordingly be no surprise if I shall essentially limit myself to one 
African society, that of the Zande of North-Eastern Congo, even if 
what I say or write could possibly apply to the members of the same 
group who live in the the neighbouring Central African Republic or 
the Sudan; this is a classical example of the splitting of African pre-
colonial societies as a result of colonialism.  What is essential is that 
I do not pretend that my case study is valid for the whole of the 
continent. 
Nearly fifty years ago, when I arrived in the Zande country, I had 
just completed my first year of teaching as a part-time “assistant” 
(tutor) in the Faculty of Law at Brussels Free University from which 
I had graduated in 1956 before serving for eighteen months as a 
candidate reserve officer in the Belgian Air Force ground units that 
specialized in the defense of airfields against possible paratroopers 
from Eastern Europe!  The people of whom I was instructed to study 
the system of land tenure were as unknown to me as the heart of 
Africa was to Joseph Conrad seventy years before, when he landed 
on the shores of the Congo river.  The only advantage I had on the 
famous novelist was that there was some literature about Zande land 
tenure.  But I was clearly paid to go beyond it, as it appeared 
unsatisfactory both quantitatively and qualitatively.  I accordingly 
spent six months in the field talking through an interpreter with 
many Zande chiefs or simple peasants about what their legal 
connection to land could be. 
 When doing this, I clearly was a foreigner approaching an 
African society from the outside-in on the basis of what he had 
learned, some years before, in a classical positivist law school about 
“ things” or rather, more generally, about property (les biens) in the 
Belgian (which is the French) Civil Code.  At that stage of my 
career, no need to say I had few (if any) qualms about what “law” 
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was.  I also knew that African laws were essentially “customary,” as 
they were, mutatis mutandis, in the Northern part of France in the 
Middle Ages, before the writing down of the customs as of the 15th 
century onwards; this topic was precisely the one I was currently 
discussing with my students during my tutorials.3  Beyond that 
sketchy and inapropriate background, I had read some contemporary 
classics on structuralism by Claude Lévi-Strauss and  bought a copy 
of the Notes and Queries in Anthropology published by the Royal 
Anthropological Institute in London.4  All this does not plead very 
much in favour of those who were sending me in the context of an 
interdisciplinary mission entrusted with the task of advising the 
Belgian governement about the economic and social development of 
the Zande country. 
In so far as I am concerned it nevertheless was a shattering 
experience on two counts: at first, it deeply transformed me from a 
legal point of view; second, it made me aware of the importance of 
linguistics in the study of laws.  Both had to deal with what I had 
decided, many years before, my professional life would be: that of a 
teacher.  Until then, the law was to me an abstraction with a 
universal value of which I had tried to master the intricacies in order 
to pass examinations and get a piece of paper which would open 
doors to a comfortable future.  I had been exposed to some limited 
aspects of its relativity through an introductory three credits course 
devoted to the common law, but that was all.  Furthermore that 
course was taught in French with an occasional mention of English 
terminology whenever it was indispensable to distinguish concepts.  
But that was all.  No fundamentals as to what a legal system or the 
limits of translation were ever challenged.  My first contact with a 
single African legal system on a very narrow point–the law of 
immovable property– irremediably changed all that. 
 
I.   IS THERE A NAME FOR PROPERTY? 
 
My contribution to a better knowledge of the Zande world was to 
present a clear view of the local land tenure system.  These last three 
 
3. See Jacques Vanderlinden, The Recording of Customary Law in France 
during the XVth and XVIth Centuries and the Recording of African Customary 
Law, JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW 165-175 (1959). 
4. NOTES AND QUERIES ON ANTHROPOLOGY (Royal Anthropological Institute 
of Great Britain and Ireland, 6th ed. 1951). 
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words obviously sound more anthropological than legal, the latter 
adjective referring normally to something quite familiar to lawyers in 
systems where the law has a well-defined meaning.  As the Zande 
apparently had no distinct word in their vocabulary to identify law, 
there was no use to ask them what their law about immovable 
property was.  
Yet they had courts and, interestingly enough, I met a case where 
a distinction was made between two ways of solving conflicts 
between individuals.  The problem involved a husband and his wife.  
She was the plaintiff and she was denied any remedy.  The problem 
she brought in front of the court was not considered because, the 
judges said, it was not one of those within their jurisdiction.5  It 
rather fell within the jurisdiction of the parents of both parties who 
had to sort it out between themselves.  Would that provide us with a 
distinction between what is legal and what is anthropological?  Or 
would it be only be an aspect of the legal pluralism existing within 
Zande society?  According to a positivist lawyer’s view, perhaps,  
but certainly not for the Zande people involved.  In fact, the 
American or European lawyer is irresistibly tempted to project onto 
African society his own conception of law.  By doing so, he looks at 
local society from the outside-in and the validity of such approach is 
quite debatable.  
Whatever the result of a possible debate may be, I chose to adopt 
that approach and to have a good look at local cases as reported in 
the native courts archives.  I perused 2,000 of them in the course on 
long evenings next to an oil-lamp roaring beside me, found out that 
some 500 had to deal with private law and, finally, that there was not 
a single case dealing with land tenure (not to speak of anything like 
immovable property).  At that stage, I could either give up and go 
back to Europe or decide to take the anthropological path and inquire 
through field work and interviews with inhabitants of the Zande 
country.  I chose the second possibility.  Thus while carrying on with 
the analysis of my 2,000 cases which allowed me to publish my 
book, the Coutumier, jurisprudence et doctrine du droit zande,6 I 
turned myself into a legal anthropologist during daytime, visiting 
 
5. A lawyer trained in Roman law–but many others too–would immediately 
think of the maxim de minimis non curat prator.  But beware of such too easy 
comparison! 
6. JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, COUTUMIER, JURISPRUDENCE ET DOCTRINE DU 
DROIT ZANDE 350 (Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie 1969). 
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farmers day after day, walking with them through their fields, sitting 
in their habitat and trying to find what their answer was when 
questioned on the basis of the Notes and Queries in Anthropology, 
and also of some supplementary questions of my own. 
 Some conclusions resulted from that fieldwork.  Here they are: 
1. Each Zande socio-political unit–let us give it the name the 
Belgian colonial authorities gave it, that is, chiefdom–occupied a 
specific area of land.  This area had a specific name in paZande (the 
language of the Zande): sende.  Anyone could settle on a sende, 
provided he got the authorization to do so from the local authority–
let us again give him the name the Belgian colonial authorities gave 
it, that is, chief.  Normally, no chief would ever refuse a candidate, 
as the more people that lived within his jurisdiction the more 
powerful he was and was considered a “big” chief.  Once he had 
admitted someone on the sende, the chief would help him to find a 
suitable place where he could settle down and establish his kporo; 
there was no question of the chief imposing a place on his new 
subject.  
2. Land in the Zande country was plentiful, of an average-poor 
quality, agricultural techniques were rudimentary, and manuring 
practically non-existant as cattle could not resist the tse-tse fly.  
Everyone could find a plot on which to establish his kporo.  This was 
the place where he would build his house, open up a garden of 
various plants, organize his kitchen area, rest during daytime 
between his activities, meet whith his family and visitors, etc.  Not 
too far from the kporo, he would clear, within the limits of his 
physical strength, the öti or cleared land on which he would start 
further work in order to open a bino on which he would grow the 
main crop providing him with the basis of his subsistence and that of 
his family.  The products of that subsistence agricultural economy 
were supplemented by the produce of the family garden and hunting 
(often practised with some neighbours in order to facilitate it).  Part 
of these products went to the chief who would redistribute it on 
specific occasions, such as holding a court to solve litigation 
between his subjects.  Finally, as this subsistence economy may be 
considered to be a fairly rudimentary one, land had to be left resting 
regularly between crops and, accordingly, the bino regularly lied 
fallow for some time. 
 3. Such a factual description leads to one conclusion: as 
everyone lives in that way, including the chief, who has his own 
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kporo as a center of his personal life, land, as far as one could judge, 
never was an object of any special interest, and accordingly an object 
for any litigation, being altogether admitted that there could always 
be exceptions justifying the rule, but also that I did not meet any 
sample of it, either during my fieldwork or in the existing literature.  
A second conclusion is that the social intercourse between persons 
about land appears, until now, practically (but for the necessity for 
anyone wishing to settle on the sende to be authorized to do so by 
the chief) void of any element a lawyer would call property law, or 
an anthropologist, land tenure.  In order to bring legal notions into 
the picture, one needs to look at what are the powers (or privileges) 
related to the different categories of land and exercised by the people 
described in the previous paragraphs.  Hence, the interviews  brought 
me into the system as perceived by those living in it and not anymore 
by the outsider. 
 4. In that perspective, let’s consider first the sende.  Its limits are 
determined by the chief and the chief alone.  He is also the only one 
able to decide that the sende will be abandoned by the group 
(thereby relinquishing all powers on it) if there is a need for the 
group to migrate.  As long as the group is established on the sende, 
the chief has, besides his exclusive power to admit newcomers on it 
(see par. 1), full control over its parts where his subjects have not 
established their kporo, öti or bino.  But they, in turn, have on that 
part of the sende the complete power to freely circulate on it, to 
modify the place of their kporo, their öti or their bino, to collect the 
wood they need to build their houses or to make fire, to hunt; in 
short, take advantage of the sende as they please for their own use 
and that of their family as long as it does not infringe on another 
person’s situation.  In a sense, the parties involved try constantly to 
achieve equilibrium between whatever the chief wishes to do with 
some parts of the sende and the limits of whatever his subjects want 
to use it for.  This is the reflection of a wish for consensus between 
rulers and the people they rule.  Being a “good” chief requires the 
preservation of such reciprocal harmonious behaviour.  The powers 
of the chief vis-à-vis the sende is expressed in a word, ira, which 
qualifies the chief.  And the same word applies to his powers over 
the people living on the sende.  He is accordingly ira sende and ira 
Azande.            
 5. If the chief has theoretically extensive powers on the sende, 
the same is true of the individual established on it for any part he 
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considers to be his.  He alone begins with the determination of the 
limits of his kporo, his öti or his bino, decides who is allowed to 
circulate on them, what he is going to build or plant on his öti, and 
ultimaltely, possibly, will make up his mind to abandon them and let 
them turn back to the sende from which they had been taken through 
his actions.  Powers as to land in the Zande country are indeed 
acquired by the individual through the incoporation of his work on a 
part of the sende.  The latter could be considered, when looked at 
from the outside, as “virgin” land; that is, land which has not yet 
been transformed by man’s actions; the three elements (kporo, bino 
and öti)7 we have been referring to could be called “transformed” 
land, and, apparently, in order to qualify collectively these various 
species of transformation of the sende, there is no generic word in 
the local language which could be opposed to the latter.  
Furthermore–and this is where the real rub appears, as in Hamlet’s 
perception of sleep–we quickly realize that the individual is also 
called ira kporo, ira bino or ira öti, the same word used for the chief 
vis-à-vis the sende and the Zande.  But this is a problem for part two 
of this paper.  Finally, the fruits which any Zande may hope to 
extract from the land through the incorporation of his work on it will 
definitely be his, to share with a possible family.    
 6. Looking at what has just been described in the 
anthropologist’s way with a lawyer’s eye, one immediately enters 
slippery ground.  One indeed quickly tends to recognize, even if a 
more detailed approach could lead to distinctions, two of the 
classical components of the classical Roman concept of ownership: 
the usage (usus) and the fruits (fructus), being absolutely clear that 
the Zande language has no special general term regrouping the 
components of the two notions.  So far, so good.  But then 
immediately arises one of the most debatable, if not challengeable, 
assumptions about pre-colonial African land tenure:  the absence in 
African systems of land tenure of an individual power of disposing 
of land, the latter being necessarily common to the group and not 
within reach of the individual.  Let us try to have a look at the 
various aspects of what the Roman concept of abusus may 
encompass, and distinguish between different ways of disposing 
from one’s land.  
Abusus involves three coupled distinctions: 
 
7. These three are but examples of a wide variety of specific lands coming out 
of the sende through work.  
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a) Alienation inter vivos or mortis causa; 
b) Gratuitous alienation or alienation against compensation; 
c) Alienation for the benefit of a member of the social group or for a 
stranger. 
         7. Let’s consider the three above-mentioned distinctions:  
a) Alienation inter vivos is the only one which can be contemplated 
as, in the case where a head of family dies, his death is generally 
attributed to bad fortune, the latter being necessarily associated to the 
place where he lived.  There is thus no question that someone would 
stay (this is the case for whoever we would be tempted to consider as 
his heirs) or come and settle down in such place as he would be 
likely to be the victim of the same malediction.  This, of course, is 
the matter as seen by the Zande, and it would be preposterous to try 
and invoke the absence of a “rational” link between the fact of the 
death and that of the place where the kporo is established.  Exit 
alienation mortis causa.  When talking to Zande peasants of the idea 
of disposing of their land inter vivos, it simply does not seem to ever 
have come to their mind.  Why?  This question brings us to the two 
ways through which alienation can take place.  
b) Gratuitous alienation or alienation against compensation?  
Alienation of land against compensation is unimaginable, as who 
would have a piece of cultivated land available to dispose of when it 
constitutes the very basis of its subsistence and that of his family?  
And who would be in a position to dispose of extra land in a system 
where basic conditions–as described previously–for an extra 
investment are not met?  There simply is no market for land in the 
Zande country.  As for gratuitous alienation, it is even less likely– 
and for the same reasons–than onerous alienation.  And there is no 
reason to necessarily include a power of abusus other than the one–
which we have already met–of disposing of the land by abandoning 
it and letting the kporo, the bino or th ötis return to the sende from 
which they originated as distinctive sorts of land through the 
incorporation of man’s labour.  But is any man roaming through the 
Zande country free to settle down and transform the sende into a 
kporo, bino or öti?  This last question opens up a last problem. 
c) Alienation for the benefit of a member of the social group or for a 
stranger?  The matter of alienation of land is already settled through 
the previous paragraphs; it only exists when the ira of a kporo, a 
bino or an öti decides to abandon a piece of land and lets it return to 
the sende.  Could then any Zande (or non member of that ethnic 
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group) incorporate his work into the sende?  By doing so, would he 
become an ira of whatever piece of it he has so transformed?  This is 
a last point which is fundamental in trying to understand African 
land tenure.  And the answer of the Zande system on that point is 
without ambiguity: as the careful reader has certainly already 
noticed, when going through paragraph 1, only members of the 
social group, i.e. persons allowed to do so by the chief who accepts 
them as members of the group–and consequently disvest them of 
their quality of stranger–are legally able to incorporate their work 
into the sende and become (as the chief is in relation to the sende and 
the Zande) an ira of their kporo, bino or öti.  The affiliation to the 
group living on a specific sende is, in the Zande case, purely 
“political,” if one adopts a foreign classification which distinguishes 
between, for example, cultural, economic, political, or social 
affiliations; such a classification, there is no need to say, does not 
exist in the Zande way of thinking about such affiliation.  In other 
African societies, the required affiliation will be, quite often, of a so-
called “social” nature when the link results from consanguinity, even 
if one considers the quite extensive one uniting members of the same 
clan; in such case, the possibility of acquiring rights to land is 
limited to members of the clan, which includes even those who, 
being originally strangers, enter it by a ceremony of adoption.  From 
this importance of a necessary existing link between people holding 
rights to land results the idea that African land tenure is “collective” 
or, better, “communal.”  
 8. On the basis of what has been shown in the Zande example–
of which I am willing to admit that it could be atypical, but not that it 
does not lead to a reassessment of our thinking about African land 
tenure–the outside non-African observer is often led to a double 
conclusion.  When he adds the fact that there rarely is a factual 
interest in disposing of the land, even for the benefit of a member of 
the group, his inescapable twofold conclusion is a) that there is 
nothing like ownership in Africa because of the lack of abusus, and 
b) African land tenure is necessarily communal (collective has been 
abandoned because of the confusion arising easily with the collective 
conception of land tenure existing in socialist legal systems). 
 9. My personal point of view–which, I insist, is highly 
debatable–is that as long as abusus exists and people can 
individually divest themselves of their powers in connecton to land 
under some form–in the Zande case by abandoning the land on 
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which they have all the powers recognized to an ira–there is no 
justification not to speak of an ownership of land in the Roman way, 
provided–but this is never challenged–usus and fructus also exist.  
No one has ever said that alienation must be either inter vivos or 
mortis causa or gratuitous or onerous, in fact for the benefit of a 
third party, which is not the case when a Zande abandons the land in 
which he undoubtedly has well defined interests.  
10. As for the communal character, no one seems to have ever 
expressed the opinion that individual ownership disappeared when 
the transfer of ownership to strangers was either curtailed or 
excluded.  The example–for many years–of Finland and Switzerland 
are very clear on that point.  During a long period of my life, I spent 
my summer vacations in a sauna on a peninsula at the end of an 
island fifty or so miles from Helsinki.  I owned the cabin in which 
we found shelter during these memorable weeks, but, as a Belgian 
citizen, I could not constitutionally own the land around it.  Would I 
or anyone, including local lawyers, have said that the friend–a Finn 
of course–who owned it, was not the owner of that land or that the 
cluster of rights and duties he had in relation to it were not 
ownership in the full sense of the word?  Certainly not from the 
Finnish point of view.  And when, in winter, I once contemplated–
but, unfortunately never got the means to do so–buying a small 
chalet in the Swiss Alps and was told that, as a foreigner, I could not 
own that piece of immovable property, could I conclude that the 
Swiss owner of the chalet was not an owner according to the relevant 
provisions of the Swiss Civil Code?  Of course not.  Like his Finn 
counterpart (but in a more specific way as such limitation in 
Switzerland was essentially local and not general as in Finland), he 
was an owner.  Perhaps a slightly different one than his counterpart 
in Belgium or Louisana, but still an owner.  This being admitted, 
would one dare to say that the Zande ira is an “owner”? 
 
II. IS TRANSLATION POSSIBLE? 
 
 The last word of the previous section brings me to my second 
section.   But before considering some problems involved in the 
linguistic transfer of African legal concepts in Western European 
languages and the amount of doubts and dissatisfaction the exercise 
leaves in the mind, there seems to be one point on which most 
people interested in the matter seem to agree.  What is more, it is 
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directly relevant to the thread which unites the contributions to this 
workshop, even if it is quite different from the ones usually 
considered.  It is, of course, a creation of American or European 
minds observing African reality and creating abstract categories 
which do not necessarily exist in African minds or languages.  It is 
the concept of the person-thing entity or unit.  
Many anthropologists observing African land tenure have come 
to the conclusion that land tenure does not deal so much with 
relations between persons about land, but concerns rather the 
analysis of the single entity that man has with earth or–why not?–the 
latter has with the former.  The one does not exist without the other 
and, in that respect, one might say that African legal geography 
(etymologically writing about the earth) is necessarily physio-human 
geography and not purely physical geography.  Or, as some are 
inclined to say, “man does not own the land, the latter owns him.”8       
 If we now look at the components of that entity or unit, the 
person is not considered as an abstraction but as a diversity of human 
beings occupying in society a specific position because of their age, 
their sex or their cultural, economic, political or social function.  The 
same is true–as it was underscored in the previous paragraphs–for 
what we call “land,” which is never considered in such abstract way, 
but always linked to a specific function.9  Thus a correct analysis of 
land tenure necessarily goes through a previous careful analysis of 
both components of it.  And ends up with a presentation of a cluster 
of person-thing unit which is not necessarily systematically 
organized in societies where the need for abastract systematization is 
not as felt as in ours.  Quite obviously, my own analysis of Zande 
land tenure was, from that point of view, totally unsatisfactory.    
The immediate temptation, as the sudent of African law I was 
nearly fifty years ago in the Zande country and the teacher I also was 
(by the way, both I still believe I am) as soon as I came back from 
Africa to my class in Brussels, was to communicate.  Studying in 
order to teach was already the fundamental activity of my craft.  I 
had not too many problems with the factual realities represented by 
 
8. Quoted, without reference, in Daniel Biebuyck, Introduction, in AFRICAN 
AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 2 (Daniel Biebuyck ed., International African Institute 1963). 
9. One of the most interesting analysis from that point of view is that of G. 
WAGNER, THE BANTU OF NORTH KAVIRONDO (Oxford University Press for the 
International African Institute 1956) where he distinguishes 24 sorts of land with 
reference to its use, 5 with reference to the rights of control upon them and 7 with 
reference to its quality in Logoli vocabulary, but no term for “land” in the abstract.   
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the paZande words öti, kporo, bino or sende.  I rather easily decided 
that the first one would be “cleared land,” i.e., the part of land of 
which all obstacles had been removed in order to possibly sow and 
cultivate some vegetation on it; the second one, “habitat,” i.e. the 
part of land upon which a house and his separated and aerated 
kitchen would be built, plus whatever land was freed and prepared 
for circulation around the house and the kitchen to receive guests, or 
for any other use; the third one, “field” as it had to be sown and 
tended on the bino in order to produce some crop; and, last but not 
least, sende.  With the latter, things appeared more difficult indeed.  I 
did not favour territory, as the latter has, in French legal language, a 
specific technical meaning “linked with public law” (a non-existent 
notion in Zande thought), which, if used to sum up the Zande reality, 
was conducive to serious potential confusions.  
 In that respect, it was true that “territoire” had a less specific and 
technical meaning in French when speaking of the territory of 
animals.  But, for obscure reasons, that reference when speaking of 
people discouraged me from using the word.  Re-reading my text of 
1960 (the year of its publication), it appears that I did not venture in 
a translation and satisfied myself with a description of approximately 
twenty lines of what the sende was.  Would I dare to propose today 
the “physical support of social life,” which is far from short and 
elegant? And also quite abstract, when compared to the formulation 
of Wagner, “bush land that has never been cultivated”10 for ovulimu 
in the Logoli language, which seems to be the nearest to the Zande 
sende.  
But this was not the end of my qualms.  The real test came with 
the three letters of ira, either when we apply it to the individual or 
when it concerns the chief.  In fact, at a first stage, the problem was 
not so much with the ira kporo, bino or öti.  In accordance with the 
conclusions I came to in paragraph 10 above, “owner” could seem 
provisionally acceptable to me, provided one admitted (this still does 
not fully satisfy me, as we shall see later) that ownership never is as 
absolute as one likes it to be and that the Finns or the Swiss may–
with some approximation–be called owners as much as the Belgians 
or the Louisianians.  We would then have no problem in calling the 
Zande commoner an owner, something of which Allott would totally 
disapprove when he writes that “the words ‘own’ and ‘ownership’ 
are . . . misleading, for the description of African property 
 
10. Id. at 76. 
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systems.”11  And he is indeed quite right.  But then–in order to carry 
his logic on a wider geographical space–I would consider that 
ownership is as much misleading when comparing Finnish or Swiss 
law with either English or French law, as both of the latter have no 
restriction whatsoever linked to the nationality of the buyer of a 
piece of land in England or France. Good enough.  But, then, how do 
I translate ira when referring to the individual?  May I beg the reader 
to be patient and keep the question unanswered for a while? 
 Turning now to the chief, the matter seems–prima facie–simpler 
than in the previous case.  Certainly he is not, in any sense, the 
owner of either the sende or the Zande as the local language 
indicates.  This was clear to my mind.  But then, which French word 
to use?  I finally decided in favour of “master” (maître). 
  Such choice was motivated by a fundamental wish, i.e. to find a 
single word in French (as in paZande where one finds ira) which 
could apply to both the chief and his subject.  If I had accepted not to 
take that wish of linguistic homogeneity into consideration, the 
problem would have been easily solved, by using “lord” for the chief 
and “owner” for the commoner.  But I had the feeling that by doing 
so I was introducing in my description the distinction between public 
and private law, so familar to me through my legal education, but 
totally absent from the Zande mind.  The thing would perhaps have 
been easier if I had been trained in the common law where that 
fundamental distinction has long been absent from the doctrinal 
sphere.  But I was communicating with continental lawyers educated 
differently and for which the split between public and private was 
fundamental in the legal discourse.  “Maître” had the advantage that 
it was still used (yet only once) in the French or Belgian Civil Code 
when speaking of the liability of masters for the wrongful acts of 
their servants (art. 1384, al. 5) and (this time, twice) when referring 
to property which is vacant or “without master” (art. 539 and 713).  
Maître could thus apply to both persons and things, as did ira when 
concerning either the sende–a thing–or the Zande–a person.  This for 
the public law side.  As for the private law one, didn’t popular 
wisdom say that “charbonnier est maître chez soi” (literally “a 
coalman is the master in his own house,” or, in accordance with the 
English idiom “a man’s house is his castle”)? 
 
11. A.N. Allott, Language and Property: A Universal Vocabulary for the 
Analysis and Description of Proprietary Relationships, 11 AFRICAN LANGUAGE 
STUDIES 12, 20 (1970). 
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 Fifty years later, I admit that all this seems (or should I write is?) 
amateurish. Had I been better informed of the existing 
anthropological literature about what I had to study, I would also 
have realized that in many African societies–as in the case of the 
Zande with ira–a single word is used to characterize the most 
extensive powers of a person on land.12  But, the reader knows, from 
the introduction to this paper, in which circumstances and with 
which kind of training (or should I write non-training?) I marched 
into the heart of darkness; my total ignorance of methodology, 
substance and form insofar as what I had to study is obvious.  What 
is perhaps funnier is that the publication of the results of my research 
led to an invitation to the Second International African Seminar 
organized by the International African Institute in Kinshasa (then 
Léopoldville), where I spoke about the problems resulting from the 
introduction of new ways of using land among the Zande and that 
two years later, on the basis of these two papers, I was asked to open 
and occupy the chair of African customary law at the Lovanium 
University also in Kinshasa.  From then on, an incredible number of 
persons strongly believed (and still do) that I was a legal 
anthropologist.  How strange!  
All along that long road into the kingdom of academe which is 
still mine nearly half a century later, I have met many brethren–    
sometimes      close     friends–who    were    treading     along     the 
same       path.     But,     be      it    K.    Bentsi-Enchill    in    1965,13  
A.   Allott     in     1970,14    H.W.O.    Okoth-Ogendo    in    1974,15  
 
 
 
 
12. Daniel Biebuyck, supra note 8, at 3-5.  He provides examples borrowed 
from the Barotse in Zambia, the Lo Wiili, the Nsaw in Cameroon, and the Nyanga 
in the Congo.  Be it the word mung’a,  so, KEr, or mine–and one cannot but be 
struck by the likeness with the ira of the Zande–one single word indicates the most 
extensive powers a person with a specific status may have on a specific sort of 
land. 
13. K. Bentsi-Enchill, Do African Systems of Land Tenure Require a Special 
Terminology?, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 265-290 (Gordon R. 
Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995). 
14. Allott, supra note 11.  
15. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Property Theory and Land Use Analysis, in 
AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 291-305 (Gordon R. Woodman & A. O. 
Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995).  
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G. McCormack in 198316 and T.W. Bennett in 198517–only to 
mention a fewnone of them were of much help insofar as I was and 
still am concerned about the extraordinary (from an American or 
European point of view) concept of a man-earth or person-thing 
entity.  But the most influential and seminal for me was P. 
Bohannan, whom I met at length in the International African 
Institute Seminar on land tenure that I was invited to in Kinshasa, as 
I mentioned earlier in this paper.  In his presentation, Bohannan 
wrote:  
 It is . . . probable  that  no  single topic concerning Africa has 
 produced so large a poor literature . . . The ignorance derives 
less  from want of ‘facts’ than what we do not know what to 
do with  these ‘facts’ or how to interpret them.18  
His words were echoed after a week of discussions at the 
International African Institute Seminar when its organizer, Daniel 
Biebuyck wrote, under the title Problems of Analysis and 
Terminology:  
 The comparative study of the  innumerable works devoted to 
these  problems [those of  land  tenure]   reveals, as it was 
underscored in the Seminar,  the big  disparity of  approaches 
and  the  inadequacy  of  the  corresponding terminology,   the 
existence of a serie  of untrue statements and the absence of a 
 true theory in that field.19
Twenty-five years later, Bennett considered–a judgment to which 
I still subscribe today–that it was “disheartening to find that little 
progress seems to have been made”20 on that topic.  
 
 
 
16. G. McCormack, Problems in the Description of African Systems of 
Landholding, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 321-334 (Gordon R. 
Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995). 
17. T.W. Bennett, Terminology and Land Tenure in Customary Law: An 
Exercicse in Linguistic Theory, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 335-349 
(Gordon R. Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995). 
18. P. Bohannan, ‘Land’, ‘Tenure’ and Land-Tenure, in AFRICAN AGRARIAN 
SYSTEMS 101 (Daniel Biebuyck ed., International African Institute 1963).  
19. Author’s translation from the French. Daniel Biebuyck, Problems of 
Analysis and Terminology, in AFRICAN AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 1-19, n. 2 (Daniel 
Biebuyck ed., International African Institute 1963).  
20.  Bennett, supra note 17, at 335.  
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CONCLUSION  
(IF I AM STILL ABLE TO ESCAPE SELF-DERISION) 
 
In the course of the fifty years which followed my escapade in 
the Zande country, the deeper and wider I went into comparing laws, 
the more I was inclined to realize how true Karl Llewellyn was when 
he wrote:  
 Legal usage of technical words has sinned, and does still, in 
two  respects; it is involved in ambiguity of two kinds: 
multiple senses of  the  same term, and terms too broad to be 
precise in application to  the details of single disputes.  First, 
it does not use terms in single  senses, but uses the same term 
in  several  senses;  and   in  everal   senses,  indiscriminately, 
without awareness.  This invites confusion,  it makes bad 
logic   almost  inevitable,  it  makes  clear  statement  of  
 clear thought difficult, it makes clear thought itself 
improbable.  No  logician worth his salt would stand for it; no 
scientist would stand  for it.21  
I do not claim, in any way, to be considered as a logician or a 
scientist, but being forced into communication by my craft, I cannot 
but be struck by the fundamental truth emanating from these words 
first uttered when I had still two years to go before being conceived.  
 In this instance, when the Zande speak of ira or we speak of 
ownership, we all use abstract terms reflecting concepts built in our 
minds, and probably more clearly formulated in the Zande country 
where people live the law as a constant communal process than in 
our countries where they are the product of self-proclaimed 
sophisticated minds arguing, as in Byzantium, about the sex of 
angels in a language that even ordinary lawyers are at pains to 
understand.  Lawyers and perhaps more evidently legal scholars–a 
group to which I belong so that everything I write about it can 
obviously refer to me–have not yet had the capacity or the courage to 
develop a language which would at least try to be understandable by 
all lawyers of good will.  Also, no one has decided to take the time 
and courage needed for a possible systematic and rigorous 
application of the fundamental concepts defined by W.N. Hohfeld to 
African land tenure, in spite of the eloquent plea made in favour of it 
 
21. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 84 (Oceana 1978). 
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by E.A. Hoebel in his Law of Primitive Man,22 which he concludes 
by another quotation of his accomplice in the study of the Cheyenne, 
Karl Llewellyn:  “And thinking thus, in nicer terms, with nicer tools 
of thought, you pull the issue in clarity . . . unambiguously, because 
your terms are not ambiguous.”23  But these voices of scholars of 
first magnitude in legal anthropology were clamantes in deserto.  
Everything went on as if there was a definite advantage to keep the 
law ambiguous and the comparison between laws foggy.  
And yet on the rich material we currently have, from the factual 
point of view through more numerous and elaborate legal 
anthropological fieldwork, through fundmental theoretical legal 
research and also, in some instances, through a combination of both, 
it should have been possible to go beyond–and even, if one looks at 
my limited and shaky contribution on Zande law, far beyond–what 
has been common knowledge among africanists for more than a 
quarter of a century.  
I have had some occasions to plead in favour of such joint efforts 
involving scholars in the field of law and linguistics.  To no avail, 
the most reluctant being the lawyers.  For sure, their theoretical 
contribution seems more advanced than the development of research 
in African concepts about what “order” may mean in society.  Social 
anthropology has made tremendous progresses in the analysis of 
African ways of thinking; but they seem to have focused on the 
background, both factual and intellectual, which subsumes what we 
could possibly call “order” or “law.”  The task is complicated by the 
fact that many among us–including myself–have serious doubts as to 
the existence in pre-colonial African minds of a distinct mental 
category isolating what we consider as “legal” from the rest of the 
seamless web which holds those societies together.  But, at least, the 
challenge ought to be met.  And do not ask me why I did not take it 
up.  The accused can’t be forced into admitting his own guilt. 
Being currently, in the twilight of my life, I am still in the Heart 
of Darkness about what I consider to be a possible science of laws at 
large.24     
 
22. E.A. HOEBEL, LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 46-53 (Harvard University Press 
1954). 
23.  LLEWELLYN, supra note 21, at 88. 
24. I come back to this issue of a general formulation of legal concepts in Les 
nouvelles ambitions de la science du juriste: Une langue générale de 
spécialisation en droit est-elle une utopie ?, forthcoming, in a volume edited by R. 
Sacco, to be published by the Accademia nazionale dei Lincei in Rome. 
